IRIN Webspecial on the Sudan Peace Process

Many in the diplomatic community, civil society and academia, no less than the Sudanese themselves, were caught off guard by the 20 July 2002 Machakos Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) which, for the first time in 19 years of conflict, presents a real possibility of peace.

Many observers feel the real breakthrough in negotiations came with Khartoum's commitment to hold a referendum on self-determination for south Sudan and the SPLM/A's acceptance of a religion-based administration in the north, as opposed to its previous, long-standing demand of secularism for the entire country.

However, observers also point to the need for greater clarity on these and other contentious issues yet to be addressed in a subsequent round of negotiations.

In this and a series of accompanying reports, IRIN provides some of the background to these issues and explores their significance to the search for peace.

IGAD and the DoP

Under the Declaration of Principles (DoP), which was presented to the warring parties in November 1993 and has formed the basis of the IGAD peace initiative on Sudan, it was suggested that the south be given the right to a referendum on "independence versus unity" if agreement could not be reached on the establishment a secular democratic state.

However, it was not until 1997 that the countries of IGAD (comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda, in addition to Sudan) managed to gain agreement from both parties to accept the DoP as a basis for negotiations, says John Young, an expert on the Sudan peace process.

However, with the SPLM/A's constituency committed to a referendum in the south and the movement pressing for a secular state - which the National Islamic Front (NIF) regime, since renamed the National Congress party, could not accept - negotiations made little progress, Young adds.

Within the Sudanese government, there were some moves to accept the principle of self-determination, although doubts remained as to what exactly was meant by it and as to how it could be achieved, Young adds.

Thus, the Sudanese government introduced the concept of self-determination into the national constitution and agreed to the principle of self-determination for southern Sudan in the Khartoum Agreement (otherwise known as The Sudan Peace Agreement), which it signed with Riek Machar's South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM) in 1997. That agreement, though, was never fully implemented.

Machakos Compromise

A compromise at the centre of the Machakos Protocol was Khartoum's acceptance of a referendum on self-determination in six and a half years: after a six-month pre-transition period and a six-year transition period. Indeed, the protocol specifically states the alternatives to be presented in the referendum to be to either: confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the peace agreement; or to vote for secession.

Although the government of Sudan had previously accepted self-determination in principle for South Sudan, it had not, until Machakos, signed an agreement to that effect, says John Young.

In exchange for Khartoum's commitment on self-determination, the SPLM/A gave up its demand - and that of the umbrella National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a largely northern opposition grouping of which it is a member - for a secular Sudan. Instead, according to the provisions of the protocol, the south would be ruled by a secular administration and legislation in the north would remain under Islamic Shari'ah law.

While the SPLM/A has officially called for unity under the auspices of a reconstructed New Sudan, most southern Sudanese have long favoured independence and made it difficult for the rebel movement to back away from a commitment to this, or for various mediating bodies to propose a viable compromise, says Young. But if the compromise reached at Machakos appears to involve a trade-off with respect to Shari'ah, it also entails a much longer transitional period than the SPLM/A had wanted, Young adds.

Machakos Provisions

The Machakos Protocol provided for the establishment of an Assessment and Evaluation Committee. This body (due to comprise representatives of the government, SPLM/A and members of the international community) is intended to ascertain whether or not the parties are implementing the agreement during the interim period. Its findings, and the response to them, would potentially have an impact on the outcome of the referendum.

While the protocol makes clear that "the people of South Sudan" will participate in the referendum, it does not state whether or not southerners have to be resident in the territory at the time of the vote, and whether or not they could participate while living in the north, or even outside the country.

Another issue of immense significance, and one still to be finalised, is the matter of defining what the parties to the agreement understand to be 'South Sudan'. In particular, it will have to be decided whether South Sudan includes the border and nominally northern regions of southern Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains and Abyei, which is favoured by the SPLM/A but has been strongly opposed by Khartoum in the past.

Part II�