IRIN Webspecial on the Sudan Peace Process

Setting the stage for a referendum

Regional analysts say three other issues will also figure prominently in the lead-up to a referendum: the stability of the national and southern governments, and their commitment to the peace agreement; the character of the transitional period; and the guarantees for, and engagement in, the process by the international community.

In the opinion of John Young, a major reason for the failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, which brought Sudan's first civil war to an end, was its rejection by northern political parties who had not been involved in the peace process and maintained that the government of the day lacked legitimacy because it had come to power through a military coup.

While the major northern parties currently appear to endorse the Machakos Protocol, they have expressed concerns over their lack of involvement in the negotiations.

According to Young, the northern parties are claiming (in an argument similar to that of a generation ago) that the National Congress party lacks legitimacy because its progenitor National Islamic Front came to power through military means - they are calling for a return to democracy in Sudan.

While the issues of democracy and electoral processes were not raised in the first round of negotiations in Machakos, some observers say they are likely to be considered in future negotiations. An additional and related problem to be addressed is that the Machakos Protocol is not clear on the make-up of the southern regional government in Juba.

At this stage, it is not known whether the SPLM/A will administer the south alone, but it probably does not have the capacity to take on such a daunting task, according to John Young. In the past, it has also indicated that it would welcome other parties and independents joining the government and that would give it a more democratic character.

Analysts accept that the sustainability of any peace depends crucially on Khartoum and Juba having broad-based governments that give full support to the peace agreement, and have the capacity to ensure that its provisions are carried out. John Prendergast of the International Crisis Group (ICG) has said that the form any transitional period takes will have a major influence on the outcome of the referendum.

Issues like whether the SPLM/A will maintain its own military forces or whether its army will be integrated into the national army to ensure that there are no rebellions during the transitional period (as is favoured by Khartoum) are also likely to influence southern opinion on self-determination.

Questions around the decentralisation of power, and the relative balance of power between north and south, will also be important, according to observers. For instance, if the SPLM/A assumes a major role in central government, this may encourage the movement towards an anti-separatist position in a referendum.

The SPLM/A also argues that giving the southern regional government considerable power and responsibilities would ensure support for unity. According to Young, there have been concerns in Khartoum in the past that relinquishing most state powers to the south would effectively serve to place the region on a track to independence.

International monitors

Lastly, the civil war in Sudan has bred enormous distrust between north and south, such that many southern Sudanese contacted by IRIN voiced considerable suspicion that the promised referendum would ever be held, or would be conducted fairly.

The protocol calls for "an internationally monitored referendum" but provides no details on what form this would take.

The first round of negotiations in Machakos was largely silent on the format and implementation protocols for the referendum, and observers say this will have to be clarified if southerners are to be confident about the agreement.

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