IRIN Web Special on Cote d’Ivoire crisis

Negotiations stagnate after initial successes

The talks, brokered by Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema as head of a contact group set up by ECOWAS to help resolve the Ivorian crisis, yielded a first accord on 31 October. The two sides agreed to respect the ceasefire and to refrain from "the recruitment and use of mercenaries, enrolment of children, and violations of the accord on cessation of hostilities". They pledged to urge “their authorities to refrain from any bellicose acts such as abuses and violence [and] extra-judicial killings", according to a communique issued in Lome.

The two sides also "acknowledged the need to preserve territorial integrity, respect of institutions, and constitutional legality".

Further progress was made on 1 November, when the government agreed to submit to parliament a draft amnesty law involving the liberation of jailed members of the military, an end to proceedings against people accused of jeopardising state security, the return of soldiers from exile and their reintegration into the army, and other commitments.

Since then, however, the talks have foundered. The MPCI originally demanded a review of the constitution, the resignation of President Laurent Gbagbo and new elections. The government insisted that they disarm and that they deliver on their agreement to respect the country’s territorial integrity and constitution. The MPCI later dropped its demand for Gbagbo’s resignation, but replaced it in late November with a call for a new political dispensation, including a transitional government that would prepare fresh elections, which the mediators and the governmental delegation rejected.

Talking peace, preparing for war

A diplomatic source told IRIN in mid-November that it was a struggle for the international community to keep the two sides talking.

"We are doing our best to encourage both sides to follow the path of negotiations,” the diplomat said. “War is not a viable option. But we have the perception that both sides want to go to war. They are only restrained by international pressure from the US, Britain, France and ECOWAS.

“They are bringing in reinforcements and new equipments,” he said, adding: “War means Sierra Leone and Liberia all over again. We are pushing for a negotiated settlement of the crisis, but it is very hard. The two sides are too far apart. However, the alternative is disaster for everybody. We do not believe either side can win the war. The government can retake Bouake but the rebels would move to [the western towns of] Danane, Man - Guei's territory.”

The state announced in October that it had imported arms, ammunition and vehicles needed by its troops, but originally denied claims that it had hired mercenaries. However, in late November, the spokesman of a French buffer force monitoring the ceasefire pending the deployment of troops from ECOWAS said that a column which participated in an offensive in the west included whites and English-speaking blacks.

Regional sources told IRIN that mercenaries, including Sam Bockarie, an ex-commander of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF - a former Sierra Leonean rebel group), had passed through a neighbouring country to join the rebellion.

“Many of the mercenaries came over from the DRC conflict,” Dr Abdel Fatau Musah of the Soros Foundation in Dakar told IRIN. “Since the crisis there is moving towards a resolution, they are finding new markets,” said Musah, who has been doing research on mercenary activity in Africa.

He feels the war is becoming more regionalised as had happened in the DRC. “This is very explosive for the subregion,” added Musah. Guinea is likely to implode soon, he said. “All the factors are there,” he added. “If the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire is not curtailed soon, it can become a springboard. If Cote d’Ivoire were to become a warlord zone, the implications are worse than what Liberia became for the Mano River zone.” The Mano River area comprises Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Part III