IRIN Web Special on Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict

Q. Is that sort of challenge essentially what ODI and others mean by a principled approach to humanitarian action?

A. To a certain extent, yes. There are various types of principle that we're concerned with. The more fundamental ones are less to do with the ways in which humanitarian agencies conduct themselves and much more to do with how belligerents conduct themselves.

The fundamental principles that underlie the Geneva Conventions - the distinction between combatants and non-combatants; the proportionality principle; the precautionary principle, and so on - primarily concern belligerents' conduct.

But there is an important set of secondary principles, which govern the way in which humanitarian agencies interact with these situations.

And the critical ones, to our mind, are impartiality and the principle of humanity itself: that gives the humanitarian imperative.

But impartiality is the governing principle, I think, as far as humanitarian action is concerned, and is directly analogous to the non-discrimination principle in human rights theory.

Independence is also important, and maintaining the appearance of independence is crucial [for humanitarians]. This is very relevant in Iraq at the moment, given the danger of agencies' being seen as agents of the belligerent international forces.

And neutrality is a related principle that is an essential component to maintaining secure humanitarian access in many situations.

Q. Do you think the move towards more internal or intra-state conflicts substantively alters the policy environment in which humanitarian agencies are working?

A. First of all, I think we shouldn't overstate the predominance of internal conflicts given that a number of the most recent large-scale conflicts have actually had an international dimension or, indeed, been fully-fledged inter-state conflicts - as in Kosovo, Afghanistan and now Iraq.

So it's important not to lose sight of that, or the relevance of the bulk of international humanitarian law that is concerned with international conflict.

But it's certainly true to say that internal conflicts have proliferated since the end of the Cold War. Does that complicate the policy environment? Yes, certainly it does. And, in some ways, it makes distinctions that would otherwise be clear much harder to draw.

There are various aspects to that, I suppose. One is the difficult question as to how you distinguish those situations that are, in effect, ones of internal disturbance, and those where you have a situation recognised as internal armed combat.

Where there is internal disturbance, the sovereign state has not only the right but also the responsibility to restore law and order. And there, you're looking at human rights provisions, safeguards in the state's own constitution or statutes about how the state can and should conduct itself in putting down internal disturbance or insurgency.

Where a conflict exceeds that threshold - a threshold that's set out in [additional] Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions - and then there's often a dispute as to whether it does exceed that threshold (Chechnya is an example of this) - you have other sorts of problems.

Where it does exceed the threshold, you've got the problem (even more acute than in an international armed conflict) of recognising who are the combatants.

And that's a problem for humanitarian agencies as well; it's often very difficult to know whom it is you're dealing with, where to point the finger of responsibility, not to become complicit in strategies that are actually abusive of civilian populations.

It's true to say that rebel - as well as government forces - will often deliberately blur that distinction; they will indeed take refuge and hide amongst the civilian population. And that makes it extremely hard for humanitarian agencies to know who to deal with and how to conduct themselves.

And of course that happened in microcosm in some of the refugee camps in many situations: in Goma, West Timor, Pakistan [during the Afghanistan war], and so on.

So these things are, practically, very difficult and it certainly affects the policy environment for humanitarian agencies.

I think, increasingly, humanitarian agencies have become conscious that probably the biggest protection issues are precisely those where a civilian population - and often a refugee population - is, in effect, being held to ransom by its own leadership…

And that the protection action required is demilitarisation of the refugee camp - in West Timor, for example - without which free action, free of fear, on behalf of the civilian population is just impossible.

So there are various ways in which the policy environment is complicated, particularly in internal conflicts.

There are problems, of course, in holding non-state parties to account, and some of those are a matter of legality and status.

But where a conflict exceeds the threshold in relation to IHL, such that it qualifies as an internal armed conflict, the parties will, by definition - even non-state parties - fall under responsible command, and have representative structures. We're very rarely talking about groups that are anarchic.

It's also true to say that groups like this are normally as much concerned about their image, both locally and internationally, as any state party would be … So there are various ways in which a set of protection norms, or the rules of IHL, may have a bearing on non-state parties in ways that are actually quite similar to the way they may inform the behaviour, policies and practices of state parties.

Continued