IRIN Web Special on Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict

Q: What are the responsibilities of diverse humanitarian agencies, all demanding unlimited access and quoting the humanitarian imperative under IHL, and to whom are they accountable?

A: Accountability is obviously a very challenging question within the humanitarian community right now. Certainly, we would expect agencies to be accountable to their beneficiaries, as well as to donors who are providing resources, as well as to their staff. There are degrees and ranges of accountability.

I think regardless of how diverse the agencies are, they can and do have a role to play in protection. It’s just a question of each agency trying to understand what’s its value-added is in a given context.

Agencies need to make sure protection does not fall through the cracks – at the field level and in operational planning. Sometimes, this demands a more holistic approach. There are times when it’s great if beneficiaries get material assistance, but if they don’t feel physically safe, then obviously that’s problematic.

We’ve also been doing a lot of work, for example on specific issues such as refugee camp security – trying to get governments and implementing partners to deal with insecurity from the outset of an operation, for instance how camps are laid out and designed, where they’re located.

But we’re also trying to look at other issues: making sure that appropriate measures and matrices are in place to check what kinds of violence are happening, what kind of security incidents there are, how do you work with local communities to make sure there are not tensions with displaced populations?

But always, behind this, we have to bear in mind the safety of humanitarian staff. Absolutely, they have to promote the protection of civilians, but if they themselves are insecure it makes it very difficult for them to do that.

Q: Is there a serious tension between negotiating access with combatants in the field and the principle of unhindered humanitarian access?

A: People in the humanitarian community are a very practical bunch, and the reality is that both are essential. Agencies have to insist on the general principle of full and unhindered access, but, at the same time – given the people they sometimes have to negotiate with – at times they have to make specific arrangements, like Days of Tranquillity for immunisation or the kind of Memorandum of Understanding [MOU] we spoke about.

I think it’s just the reality that sometimes, for them to operate, they have to reach specific agreements. But it doesn’t mean that they should not be vocally and insistently advocating for the principle of full and unhindered access.

Q: In what ways can belligerents be held to account for their responsibility to protect civilians?

A: A good question. I think you’d probably break it down along the lines of legal, political, economic. There are different ways in each of these areas you can hold people accountable.

Certainly, common Article III of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II applies – with equal force – to all parties, governments and non-state [actors] alike. States have obligations to punish violations of IHL treaties. States that commit grave breaches of IHL might be subject to sanctions by the Security Council.

There are other tools at the disposal of the international community and I think sanctions are an interesting one. We have seen, especially recently, how targeted sanctions can have an impact on both state and non-state actors.

Angola is interesting in that respect. The whole economic agenda in civil wars has been much more carefully looked at of late. We had the DRC panel, for instance, which tried to identify the ways in which natural resource extraction was impacting on the conflict, and how that could be addressed by the international community.

Q: Is there a case to be made for a threshold of grave breaches at which certain specified sanctions should automatically be called into play?

A: Well, to an extent, that already exists within the law, although I think we would certainly agree that states must be much more diligent in apprehending and prosecuting those that commit the most serious international crimes. The only way to really effect deterrence is to pursue and to prosecute. And prosecution can be done by any state. Or if states are unwilling or unable to prosecute serious criminals, you have now got the International Criminal Court [ICC].

Q: Is the ICC, with the judges recently sworn in, an important new tool for IHL, or does the refusal to cooperate of some major powers, including Security Council members like the US, make it inherently flawed?

A: Canada has, from the very outset, been an extremely strong supporter of, and advocate for, the Court. The ICC has the support it needs to function effectively, with or without the US – and obviously we would like the US to support it.

We have got 89 states that have already ratified the statute [establishing the ICC], bringing it into force much sooner than we ever expected. The parties that are involved include some fairly significant states: the UK, France, Germany, pretty much all the European Union and many countries in Latin America and Asia. And the ratifications are coming forward at a pretty impressive rate.

And frankly, with respect to the suggestion that there might be a fatal flaw, the lack of US support does not flow from any flaw in the Court itself. The statute contains extensive checks and balances, and limitations of powers, to prevent frivolous prosecutions. Its jurisdiction is based on long-established principles, including those the US helped to affirm at Nuremberg [with the trial of Nazi war criminals after World War II]. The crimes are the ones that are universally recognised, and the procedures comply with all international human rights laws.

So, no, we don’t think there’s a fatal flaw. Canada firmly believes that the Court was built on an extremely strong footing, that it has a wide range of support from a variety of geographic regions, including especially strong states, and we hope, over time, that those who have not ratified yet, will.

Continued