IRIN Web Special on Life in northern Uganda
"when the sun sets, we start to worry..."

Towards the end of 1993, talks between the government and the LRA gave rise to hopes for peace. However, the negotiations collapsed in early 1994, leading to a dramatic resurgence of violence in Acholiland. After the talks broke down, any support the LRA may have enjoyed among the Acholi dried up, according to observers of the war in the North. This was when the rebels began the mass abduction of children for use as porters, fighters and sex slaves, the observers say.

In June 1998, representatives of the Acholi people listed a number of reasons why the LRA's war continued after the rebels had stopped receiving popular support: Ugandan support for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army [a Sudanese rebel group]; Sudanese support for the LRA; the fact that some civilians benefited financially from the war; foreign powers' use of Uganda as a base for fighting the Sudanese government; and lack of trust between the Acholi population and the Ugandan government.

The latter half of the 1990s was marked by ongoing LRA actions in northern Uganda from bases in southern Sudan and, in early 1997, the Ugandan parliament voted, after a lengthy investigation, to continue pursuing a military strategy to end the conflict.

Around this time, too, the Acholi diaspora and the churches in Uganda began to play an increasingly active and vocal role in pushing for a negotiated and peaceful settlement to the rebellion. Groups which have been particularly active in this regard include the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI), an inter-faith forum of Muslim and Christian leaders inaugurated in early 1998.

From early 1999, there was a noticeable lull in LRA activity and a change in the political climate, especially after Museveni agreed to let community leaders and peace activists talk with the LRA. In late 1999, the Ugandan authorities announced an amnesty for LRA fighters and, in December of that year, the governments of Uganda and Sudan signed a reconciliation agreement that envisaged a series of steps to build mutual trust and, eventually, normalise diplomatic relations. These developments again raised hopes for peace.

However, within weeks of the agreement, the rebels re-entered Uganda from southern Sudan, and the hopes for an early peace were quickly shattered. LRA attacks on villages and IDP settlements resumed. Roadside ambushes became more common. Abductions, killings and looting resumed with a vengeance.

Diplomatic breakthrough, military offensive, more suffering
In 2001, Uganda and Sudan continued their efforts to improve their ties, exchanging diplomats in August of that year. In December, the US government announced that it was adding the LRA to its "terrorist exclusion list", a move welcomed by Kampala. Eager to mend relations with the US as it pursued its global war on terror, the Sudanese government said it had cut off all support to the LRA. Fearing that Sudan might take action against it, the LRA began to relocate its bases, soldiers and abductees to the remote Imatong mountains on the Sudan-Uganda border.

In early 2002, Sudan and Uganda concluded a diplomatic protocol giving the Ugandan army access to southern Sudan to attack LRA rear bases. By March 2002, the UPDF had launched 'Operation Iron Fist', a military campaign aimed at "eliminating the LRA threat and freeing abductees".

The operation, which saw the deployment of as many as 10,000 Ugandan troops, had an unintended effect. It led the rebels to return in force to northern Uganda in June 2002 - reportedly with new equipment, uniforms and training. From then on, the LRA, which split into smaller operational units, stepped up its attacks, abducting thousands of children and targeting religious leaders and other civilians. The group also attacked convoys delivering relief supplies to northern Uganda or transiting to affected populations in southern Sudan.

In October 2002, the Ugandan government gave civilians 48 hours' notice to return to IDP camps or 'protected villages', while aid agencies warned that the continuing conflict was destroying the tentative gains of the recent past.

Following sustained efforts and contacts by the ARLPI, the government appointed a peace team in late 2002. However, ARLPI noted that the LRA's attitude changed between July, when there was a military stalemate, and September 2002, as the rebels acquired new military equipment and appeared unwilling to negotiate seriously.

In March 2003, Kony announced a unilateral ceasefire. Museveni initially rejected it, then responded with a limited ceasefire in areas where the rebels were to hold talks with the presidential peace team. However, hopes for peace were dashed in April when the LRA broke the ceasefire arrangements and killed an emissary of the presidential peace team, causing the government to resume open warfare against the rebels. The peace team was disbanded in May and attempts at establishing a negotiated peace appear seriously constrained as the military option is vigorously pursued.

In June, the conflict spread beyond Acholiland, with the LRA attacking parts of eastern, central and northwestern Uganda. In Teso subregion, attacks on the districts of Katakwi, Kumi, Kabermaido and Soroti have displaced 306,000 civilians.

International attention needed
The unprecedented violence visited on civilians in northern Uganda since 2002 has given rise to the country's worst humanitarian crisis in 17 years, and sparked calls for a higher level of international attention.

Francis Deng, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on IDPs, who visited Uganda in August, said he was struck by "the level of devastation due to the conflict and the precarious situation the internally displaced are facing". Pointing to the complex and intertwined causes of the conflict, Deng noted the need for a regional perspective and possibly third-party mediation to address the problems and achieve lasting peace.

A broad range of Acholi civil and religious leaders have consistently called for dialogue as a means of arriving at a durable solution to the conflict. Another requirement, they say, is a willingness to facilitate and engage in peace talks. The international community has been showing signs of seeking engagement. However, there is little to indicate that both parties are interested in negotiations.

Most observers believe that, given the nature of the conflict, the length of time it has lasted and the scant success of military campaigns, a negotiated settlement is the only possible solution.

Many people in northern Uganda also feel this way. "With fighting, this war will take another 18 years," said one IDP. "The only thing is to sit down and negotiate."

[Ends]

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